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The classic novels offer wonderful insight into some of the dominant cultural values 
of pre-modern China. They portray values indirectly through character and narrative 
rather than through explicit identification, and they usually tell us which values are 
preferred or honored by the society and which are condemned, without telling us how 
widespread a particular set of values was, or which sectors of society tended to hold 
which values. An alternative approach to studying cultural values is the social science 
method of survey research, which allows us to measure cultural values directly and to 
describe culture as a quantitative distribution of values across a population. Of course 
survey research cannot go back in history to measure the distribution of values in the 
past. But if we compare the values presented qualitatively in classical literature with 
those described quantitatively in modern survey research, we can get some sense of 
the extent to which values have stayed the same or have changed since pre-modern 
times. 
Xunwu Chen has given an overall picture of traditional Chinese values based on 
his reading of classic novels and other texts. In one of his essays Prof. Chen writes: 
 
The traditional Chinese values were developed for a harmonious, hegemonic, and 
cooperative society, not a diverse, conflicting society. They are meant to develop 
collective or social individuals (good father, husband, son, or mother, wife, 
daughter, etc.), not individualistic or atomistic persons. That the traditional Chinese 
society was authoritarian is well known. That it was so was due in no small 
measure to the emphasis exclusively on harmony, order, propriety, and collective 
solidarity. In the traditional ethical discourse, questions of individual rights, 
autonomy, and liberty were totally absent.1  
 
Passages from the classic novels serve to illustrate these points. For example, the 
heroes of The Romance of the Three Kingdoms place priority on loyalty to the group 
instead of selfish interest. In the Peace Garden Oath, the three heroes Liu Bei, Guan 
Gong, and Zhang Fei swear, “We three, though of separate ancestry, join in 
brotherhood here, combining strength and purpose, to relieve the present crisis. We 
will perform our duty to the Emperor and protect the common folk of the land. We 
dare not hope to be together always but hereby vow to die the selfsame day…”.2 In 
                                                             
 Dr. ANDREW J. NATHAN is Class of 1919 Professor of Political Science at Columbia 
University. 
1 Xunwu Chen, “Conflict and constellation: The new trend of value development in China,” 
The Journal of Value Inquiry 31: 97–108, 1997, p. 100.  
2 Moss Roberts, trans., Three Kingdoms (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1995), Vol. I, Ch. 
1, p. 11. 
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another passage, Guan Gong rides without any troops one thousand miles to return to 
Liu Bei, crossing five gorges and slaying six famous generals.3  
Another traditional value is conflict avoidance within the group. For example, 
Patience (Ping Er) in The Story of the Stone says, “It is the sign of a really thriving 
household that their big troubles turn into little ones and their little ones into nothing 
at all. To make a great song and dance over a trifle like this would be plain 
ridiculous.”4 In The Romance of the Three Kingdoms, General Cao Cao is praised by 
comparison with a rival general Yuan Shao: “Yuan Shao is ostensibly tolerant but 
outwardly envious and awards appointments mainly to his relatives. You are 
outwardly direct and inwardly understanding and employ men according to their 
ability. Yuan Shao is often misled by petty slander; you are impervious to gossip. 
Thus, you excel in discretion.”5 
A passage from Story of the Stone illustrates the value of respect for authority. 
When Jia Yuanchun – having become an imperial consort - visits her parents on the 
Feast of Lanterns, the narrator tells that her senior relatives including even her 
grandmother had to drop to her knees as a sign of fealty; but then in respect for the 
senior relatives’ status, “As grandmother Jia and the rest dropped to their knees 
eunuchs rushed up and helped them to get up again.”6 
This paper explores the extent to which the values portrayed in the classic 
literature have stayed the same and the extent to which they have changed, using 
social science methods rather than literary analytic methods. Besides asking how 
much has or has not changed in core Chinese values, the paper examines how the hold 
of certain values varies across social groups in today’s China. It asks how 
distinctively “Chinese” are Chinese values in the comparative perspective of other 
Asian societies. And it explores the impact of values on support for authoritarian and 
democratic regimes in Asia 
Survey research is the technique of taking a sample of the population one wants 
to investigate, asking them questions, and counting the answers. The polling we read 
about in the newspapers is one form of survey research, which aims to track shifting 
opinions about contemporary political issues and people. But survey research is often 
used for other purposes, such as to look at work, family life, finances, and health, or 
at deeper, longer term attitudes, which is what this paper focuses on. 
Compared to literary analysis, survey research has advantages and disadvantages. 
One disadvantage is that a survey cannot probe into the complexity of attitudes of 
each individual; the questionnaire forces the respondent either to agree or to disagree 
with a given statement, when the respondent may actually feel a little of both ways. 
On the positive side, a well-designed survey can accurately describe the distributional 
patterns within a society of the attitudes it has measured, can compare that pattern 
                                                             
3 Three Kingdoms, Vol. I, Ch. 27-28. 
4 David Hawkes, trans., The Story of the Stone: A Chinese Novel by Cao Xueqin in Five 
Volumes, Vol. 3, “The Warning Voice” (London: Penguin, 1980), p. 184.  
5 Three Kingdoms, Vol. I, Ch. 18, pp. 305-306. 
6 Hawkes, trans., Story of the Stone, Vol. I, “The Golden Days” (London: Penguin, 1973), p. 
356. 
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across societies; and can correlate attitudes with other variables that the researcher has 
collected to see who thinks what, and potentially to tease out the causes of attitudinal 
change 
While literary analysis thinks of culture as a shared set of assumptions and 
concepts through which people in a society carry out debates over norms and values – 
a shared ground of discourse – survey research defines culture as a distribution within 
a population of beliefs, values, norms, and attitudes. The survey technique inherently 
resists the essentialization of cultures – the attribution to a given culture of one 
monolithic set of values. It treats the culture of a given community or nation as 
diverse and contested, because it measures the attitudes of each respondent separately 
and it finds different levels of agreement among a population on different value 
propositions 
This paper reports on findings from the Asian Barometer Surveys (ABS). The 
ABS conducts surveys periodically in political systems in East and Southeast Asia (all 
referred to as “countries” in this essay for convenience, although Hong Kong is part 
of China and the status of Taiwan is contested). The ABS surveyed eight countries in 
the first wave in 2001-2003, 13 countries in waves 2 and 3, and 14 countries in the 
fourth wave in 2014-2016; it is in the process of implementing a fifth wave. The ABS 
is headquartered in Taipei, at the Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica 
(IPSAS). In each member country a local team carries out the survey, in most cases 
with its own local funding, using a common core questionnaire. The survey focuses 
on attitudes toward democracy. In order to track change over time, the questionnaire 
is largely the same from wave to wave, except for some minor adjustments and added 
questions.7 
One of the batteries in the ABS core questionnaire seeks to measure “Traditional 
Social Values” (TSV). As shown in Table 1, this battery asks about a number of the 
same values that are reflected in the great pre-modern novels.8 The first set of three 
questions refers to avoiding direct conflict with others. The second three questions 
ask about subordinating the individual to the interests of the group (family, group, 
nation). The third set of three questions asks about deference to authority (parents, 
family, teacher).9 (The concepts overlap, as they are part of a single battery.) The 
question items were formulated on the basis of a wide range of literature that argues 
that conflict avoidance, groupism and deference to authority are values widely held in 
traditional societies, including in pre-modern China.10 
                                                             
7 http://www.asianbarometer.org/. 
8 In framing the TSV questions the ABS wanted to avoid referring to explicitly political objects 
like the regime or the leaders. Explicitly political questions were saved for the Liberal 
Democratic Values battery, discussed below. 
9 The division into three groups is based both on the face meaning of the questions and on 
factor analysis, which confirms statistically that each set of three items taps into a distinct 
underlying value. 
10 For example, Alex Inkeles and David H. Smith, Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six 
Developing Countries. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974); Christian Welzel, 
Freedom Rising: Human Empowerment and the Quest for Emancipation. (N.Y.: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013).  
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The table portrays a China that is poised between traditional and modern 
attitudes, with traditional attitudes still strong, but weakening. Averaging across 
questions, 64% of respondents adhere to traditional values. But the strength of the 
three sets of values is not the same. Conflict avoidance is the strongest with an 
average percentage of 84.4% of respondents agreeing with those statements. 
Groupism comes next at 63.7%. Deference to authority is the weakest at 44.3%. And 
within each cluster we note certain values that have deteriorated faster than the others. 
Three value statements in particular command less than 50% adherence: the weakest 
is deference to parents; also below 50% are conflict avoidance with co-workers and 
deference to one’s teacher. 
 
 
The likely reason for the pattern we see in the data is that China has undergone a 
rapid process of modernization in the last thirty or so years. Even though the country 
underwent invasion, civil war, and revolution in the twentieth century, it remained a 
largely peasant society until the late 1980s and early 1990s. With China’s double-
digit annual economic growth in the 1990s and 2000s came a surge in 
industrialization, the movement of vast populations to the cities, and a big expansion 
of higher education. Modernization theory argues that social changes like these cause 
changes in lifestyles and attitudes. Urban young people no longer form extended 
families with their parents as in the old days but now live in nuclear families. Higher 
education is less of a special privilege, so students are not as deferential to their 
teachers. People no longer stay in the same workplace for a lifetime, so their relations 
Table 1. Traditional Social Values in Today’s China 
For The sake of the family, the individual should put his personal interests 
second 
84.5 
Conflict 
Avoidance 
84.4 Even if there is some disagreement with others, one should avoid the conflict 86.8 
In a group, we should avoid open quarrel to preserve the harmony of the 
group 
82.0 
A person should not insist on his own opinion if his co-workers disagree with 
him 
45.7 
Groupism 63.7 In a group, we should sacrifice our individual interest for the sake of the 
group’s collective interest 70.1 
For the sake of national interest, individual interest could be sacrificed 75.2 
Being a student, one should not question the authority of one's teacher 47.1 
Deference 
to Authority 
44.3 
When a mother-in-law and a daughter-in-law come into conflict, even if the 
mother-in-law is in the wrong, the husband should still persuade his wife to 
obey his mother 
51.4 
Even if parents’ demands are unreasonable, children still should do what they 
ask 34.4 
Average   64.1 
ABS Wave 3 (2011) plus Wave 4 (2014-2016), n=7541 
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with coworkers are not as close as before.
11
 Therefore, younger, more urban, more 
educated people should hold less traditional views than older, more rural, less 
educated people. 
Table 2 suggests that this is indeed the case. The table correlates adherence to the 
TSV scale with other social and attitudinal characteristics of the respondents. It turns 
out to be true that older people, rural people, and people with less education are more 
likely to adhere to traditional values. Men are slightly more inclined to traditional 
values than women.12 
 
Table 2.China: Who Are the Traditionalists? 
male 0.035** 
age 0.267*** 
urban -0.143*** 
religiosity2 0.037** 
edu_level -0.261*** 
SOC_CAPITAL 0.003 
SOCTRUST_GENERAL 0.110*** 
MEDIATRUST2 0.162*** 
ECONPERF_FAM 0.071*** 
GOV_EFFECTIVENESS 0.189*** 
GOVERNANCE_FAIRNESS 0.343*** 
NATIONAL_PRIDE 0.233*** 
Significance levels *p<.05, **p<.o1, ***p<.001 
 
This table also shows that traditional social values have an impact on other attitudes 
that people hold. Social values tend to be carried over into the political sphere. If 
                                                             
11 For more on recent social change, see Andrew J. Nathan, “The Puzzle of the Chinese Middle 
Class.” Journal of Democracy (April 2016), pp. 5-19. 
12 “Urban” measures whether the subject’s place of residence is urban or rural. Religiosity2 
codes whether the subject describes himself as very, moderately, or lightly religious or not 
religious at all. Social capital is a factor scale of how many people the subject has contact with 
during an average week, how many people he thinks will help him and how many people he 
would help. Social trust general is the mean of answers to questions on whether you can trust 
most people, trust people to be fair, most people are trustworthy. Media trust 2 is a factor score 
of trust in newspapers and trust in TV. Econperf_fam is the mean of whether your family is 
better off today than five years ago and whether it will be better off five years from now than it 
is now. Governance effectiveness is the mean assessment of the government’s ability to control 
corruption and provide rule of law, and people’s ability to hold government accountable in 
between elections. Governance fairness is a measure based on six questions about 
government’s fairness. National pride is a mean of how proud the subject is to be a citizen and 
how willing he is to move to another country.  
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people are deferential to social authorities like parents and teachers, are willing to 
identify with the social group, and prefer to avoid social conflict, then they are more 
likely also to defer to political authorities, identify with the political unit, and avoid 
political conflict. The table shows that those with more traditional values are more 
likely to trust other people in society; to assess their family’s economic situation as 
having improved; to view the government as effective and fair; and to express pride in 
being Chinese.13  
 
Table 3. How Unique is China: Traditional Social Values in Chinese-Influenced Societies 
 
China Singapore Japan Hong Kong Korea Taiwan Vietnam 
For the sake of the family, the individual 
should put his personal interests second 
84.5 83.4 79.1 79.3 83.4 84.7 88.8 
In a group, we should sacrifice our 
individual interest for the sake of the 
group’s collective interest 
70.1 73.2 51.1 45.9 58.3 72.4 87.9 
For the sake of national interest, individual 
interest could be sacrificed 
75.2 63.8 21.0 34.9 51.1 49.0 80.4 
Even if parents’ demands are unreasonable, 
children still should do what they ask 
34.4 40.6 24.9 25.5 46.3 29.4 71.6 
When a mother-in-law and a daughter-in-
law come into conflict, even if the mother-
in-law is in the wrong, the husband should 
still persuade his wife to obey his mother 
51.4 35.1 14.0 24.7 40.1 33.7 89.0 
Being a student, one should not question the 
authority of one's teacher 
47.1 50.6 36.1 38.4 38.9 37.7 89.7 
In a group, we should avoid open quarrel to 
preserve the harmony of the group 
82.0 81.1 79.8 70.7 62.6 81.6 67.0 
Even if there is some disagreement with 
others, one should avoid the conflict 
86.8 78.8 55.3 73.4 65.6 79.8 39.6 
A person should not insist on his own 
opinion if his co-workers disagree with him 
45.7 69.5 60.0 53.0 62.0 63.9 34.6 
Average 64.1 64.0 46.8 49.5 56.5 59.1 72.1 
 
Respondents with higher TSV are also more likely to trust the media. But in the case 
of media trust, the relationship may run both ways. The Chinese government actively 
                                                             
13 We assess TSV as a cause and the other attitudes as effects because traditional social values 
are instilled earlier in life and change less readily than the other attitudes we are measuring 
here. 
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promotes traditional values through official media and education campaigns on 
“harmonious society” and the study of Confucianism. So not only do traditionalists 
trust the media more, but those who trust the media more are more strongly 
influenced by government propaganda that reinforces their traditional values and that 
also reinforces their positive views on economic performance, governance, and 
national pride.  
Is the impact of modernization on traditional values the same everywhere, or is 
there something special about the way it affects values in China? We have not had the 
opportunity to ask the TSV battery around the world, but we have fielded the same 
battery in all 14 countries in the Asian Barometer Surveys. Tables 3 and 4 compare 
the level of belief in traditional social values in China to the levels in other Asian 
countries. Table 3 compares China to the countries closest to it, three of which are 
predominantly ethnically Chinese, while the others have been strongly influenced by 
Chinese culture. Table 4 compares China to societies where ethnic Chinese are in the 
minority, where Confucianism and the Chinese writing system had little effect, and 
where the predominant religions are Buddhism, Islam, or Christianity.  
As a general pattern, wealthier countries have lower levels of average TSV than 
poorer countries. Thus, the average TSV in Japan is 47% and in Myanmar it is 78%. 
This general pattern is shown in Figure 1.  
 
 
 
Even so, traditionalism stands above 50% in all but two of the countries in our study. 
Although we do not have comparable data from other regions of the world, the table 
generates a strong hypothesis that traditional attitudes in Asia may be more resistant 
to the dissolving effect of economic development than in some other regions. Another 
way to say this is that traditional cultural values remain highly valued in this region; 
Asian populations place a high value on their traditional ways of life.   
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Table 4. How Unique is China? Traditional Social Values in Islamic and Buddhist Societies  
 
China Thailand Indonesia Mongolia Philippines Malaysia Myanmar Cambodia 
For the sake of the family, the 
individual should put his personal 
interests second 
84.5 86.6 90.4 86.7 79.7 81.2 92.9 80.3 
Even if there is some 
disagreement with others, one 
should avoid the conflict 
70.1 83.3 92.3 80.8 91.1 71.0 97.1 94.0 
In a group, we should 
avoid open quarrel to 
preserve the harmony of the 
group 
75.2 81.6 93.4 81.5 84.2 70.2 85.5 95.3 
A person should not 
insist on his own opinion if 
his co-workers disagree with 
him 
34.4 81.7 86.8 77.9 76.1 56.8 92.6 75.5 
In a group, we should 
sacrifice our individual 
interest for the sake of the 
group’s collective interest 
51.4 87.7 78.3 61.8 68.9 59.4 77.0 66.0 
For the sake of 
national interest, 
individual interest could 
be sacrificed 
47.1 85.1 73.5 76.0 64.4 62.0 83.6 73.8 
Being a student, one 
should not question the 
authority of one's teacher 
82.0 47.6 82.3 46.7 61.7 90.4 65.9 72.4 
When a mother-in-law 
and a daughter-in-law 
come into conflict, 
even if the mother-in-
law is in the wrong, 
the husband should 
still persuade his wife 
to obey his mother 
86.8 41.9 80.0 29.6 44.3 90.7 78.3 75.3 
Even if parents’ 
demands are  
unreasonable, children 
still should do what 
they ask 
45.7 35.5 50.4 47.1 48.8 73.2 76.5 76.7 
Average 641 70.1 80.8 65.3 68.8 72.8 83.2 78.8 
 
Singapore is an exception to the relationship between wealth and non-traditional 
attitudes. It is the wealthiest country, highly urbanized, with a highly educated 
population, but it has an average TSV comparable to that of China (64%). This may 
the result of government efforts to promote traditional values. Like the Chinese 
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government, the Singapore government has officially promoted Confucian values in 
their society. 14  This seems to have had an effect in slowing the values-changing 
effects of modernization. Even so, it has not stopped those effects. 
The two other countries where traditional social values are stronger than the 
overall trend line would predict are the predominantly Muslim countries of Malaysia 
and Indonesia. As in China and Singapore, this is not an accident. In both countries, 
dominant political forces have promoted Islam as part of the national identity. TSV 
are also little stronger than the trend line predicts in the predominantly Buddhist 
countries of Thailand and Myanmar where, again, the governments make use of 
Buddhist identity in their construction of national identities. So it seems that 
governments can promote deference and conflict avoidance by promoting a religious 
identity among their citizens.  
Reading across the rows, the weakest values are almost the same throughout Asia 
as they are in China. While the average of the per-country levels of adherence to TSV 
across the region is 66.6%,15 the proposition that one should obey one’s parents is 
agreed to by an average of only 45% of national populations; the proposition that a 
husband should ask his wife to yield to his mother commands only 46% agreement; 
and the proposition that a student should not question a teacher commands only 54% 
(these numbers are not shown in the tables). In general, then, it is the value of 
deference to authority that is eroding most rapidly across Asia, reaching very low 
levels in Japan, which is a competitive electoral system, and in Hong Kong, a region 
of China with a degree of local autonomy conditioned by an increasing degree of 
influence from Beijing, and where several active political movements have recently 
emerged seeking more local democracy and more independence from mainland 
China.  
The pattern we saw in Table 2 generally holds across Asia (although not shown 
here). Educated urban dwellers are less traditional-minded; older people are more 
traditional-minded; the influence of sex is not strong, but in most countries, as in 
China, men are more traditional-minded than women. And, as in China, traditional 
attitudes generally contribute to increase social trust and to positive evaluations of 
government performance.  
Thus the overall picture is consistent across the region. Long-standing social 
values change slowly. Traditional social values remain strong except in the most 
highly modernized societies of Japan and Hong Kong, and even there they command 
agreement from close to half of the population. Whether these are “Asian values,” as 
some analysts claim, or more general traditional values found in many societies, is 
something we cannot answer from the Asian Barometer Surveys, although I tend to 
think they are the latter. 
 
                                                             
14  Beng Huat Chua, Liberalism Disavowed: Communitarianism and State Capitalism in 
Singapore. (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2017). 
15 This number is the average of the national averages, rather than a pan-regional average. That 
is, I have not weighted the figures by size of national populations.  
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Table 5. Liberal Democratic Values (% disagreeing) by Country Democracy Order 
 
JP KR TW MNG INDON HK PHIL MAL SING THAI CAMB VN CH MY Avg 
Gov’t leaders are like 
head of family; we 
should follow their 
decisions 
82.1 61.6 77.3 42.4 23.6 65.1 56.0 32.5 40.1 51.6 34.8 30.4 31.6 27.2 46.9 
The gov’t should 
decide whether 
certain ideas should 
be allowed to be 
discussed in society 
79.7 56.3 74.7 26.0 35.7 58.8 42.0 25.6 37.6 33.8 14.3 7.6 37.9 45.7 41.1 
Harmony of 
community will be 
disrupted if people 
organize lots of 
groups 
52.5 60.6 43.4 25.5 36.1 41.5 47.0 25.5 32.9 21.7 45.0 18.9 23.4 22.7 35.5 
When judges decide 
important cases, they 
should accept the 
view of the executive 
branch 
70.3 67.4 59.0 52.6 39.4 52.0 33.2 43.6 30.0 48.8 36.2 14.7 35.0 30.0 43.7 
If the gov’t is 
constantly checked 
by the legislature, it 
cannot possibly 
accomplish great 
things 
57.9 59.1 38.7 44.9 46.4 42.0 37.1 44.8 47.8 44.6 45.1 29.8 31.0 19.0 42.0 
If we have political 
leaders who are 
morally upright, we 
can let them decide 
everything 
57.3 41.7 75.1 24.1 47.2 60.5 38.3 55.3 36.2 22.3 12.6 20.2 46.9 7.5 39.0 
If people have too 
many different ways 
of thinking, society 
will be chaotic 
44.1 57.0 33.2 31.5 34.3 33.2 32.0 27.5 32.0 16.7 34.5 23.1 35.4 17.3 32.3 
Average 63.4 57.7 57.3 35.3 37.5 50.4 40.8 36.4 36.6 34.2 31.8 20.7 34.4 24.2 40.05 
 
But in Asia, as elsewhere, values do change, as younger people get more educated 
and move to cities. The value of deference to authority seems to weaken faster and the 
value of avoiding conflict seems to weaken most slowly. What is happening in China 
is more or less typical of the region.  
At the same time that social values change, political values have also faced 
challenges in the modern period. For a century or more, Asia, like other regions, has 
been the scene of a struggle over political systems and political values, ranging from 
monarchism to Marxism, fascism to liberal democracy. To see how political values 
are changing in China and in the region and how those changes are related to changes 
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in social values, we can turn to a battery of ABS that assesses respondents’ support 
for Liberal Democratic Values (LDV).  
Table 5 displays the percentage agreement in each country with seven statements 
that are intended to tap into core values of a liberal democratic system. The strategy in 
drafting this battery was to present statements that contravene liberal democratic 
values and count disagreement with these statements as a sign that the respondent 
adheres to LDV. Also note that in this table, the countries are arranged not in order of 
GDP per capita but from left to right in the order of their 2010 ratings by Freedom 
House.16  
 
 
 
The relationship of LDV to the type of political system is what one might expect. As 
shown in Figure 2, in general, the more democratic a country’s political culture is, the 
more democratic is its political system. One exception is Mongolia, where a dramatic 
political transition in 1990 brought in a democratic system to govern what had been a 
rural, poor, and authoritarian society, so that political change went faster than cultural 
change. Another, and opposite, exception is Hong Kong, where, although about half 
of the public is pro-democracy by our measure, Freedom House gives the territory a 
low score on political rights and freedoms due to the control exerted over its 
government by Beijing.  
Returning to Table 5, on average, differences in the level of democratic culture 
across the region are large. At the highest, 63% of Japanese respondents agree with 
LDV, while the lowest number is 21% in Vietnam. China’s level of adherence at 34% 
is below the average for the region. The specific propositions that make up the battery 
command different levels of support in different countries. The most rejected 
proposition overall is the idea that we should follow government leaders 
unquestioningly because are like heads of a family. This proposition is most strongly 
rejected in Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Korea, 17  but by weak majorities or 
                                                             
16 https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2010.  
17 Korea in this paper refers to South Korea. 
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minorities elsewhere. The least rejected proposition is the idea that society will be 
chaotic if people have too many ways of thinking; this proposition is rejected by a 
majority only in Korea. There is not a single item that is rejected by a majority across 
the region; liberal democracy is not a hegemonic set of values in Asia.  
 
Table 6. TSV LDV Correlation 
Japan -0.236 
Korea -0.349 
Taiwan -0.319 
Mongolia -0.321 
Indonesia -0.154 
Hong Kong -0.486 
Philippines -0.276 
Malaysia -0.293 
Singapore -0.347 
Thailand -0.253 
Cambodia -0.345 
Vietnam -0.302 
China -0.465 
Myanmar -0.502 
Notes: Waves 3 & 4 combined, 
weighted data. All coefficients 
significant at the .001 level 
 
Table 6 shows that TSV and LDV are negatively correlated everywhere. As people 
move away from traditional social values, they also tend to adopt liberal democratic 
political values. The table further shows that the strength of this negative correlation 
is stronger in the more authoritarian states than in the more democratic states. What 
this means is that in more democratic states, citizens are more able to hold both liberal 
democratic values and traditional social values at the same time, obviously reflecting 
the socializing influence of the political system on specifically political values even 
on those persons who hold traditional values in the social sphere. 18  In more 
                                                             
18 Thus, Xunwu Chen is correct to say that traditional Chinese values are not “necessarily 
antagonistic to and incompatible with individual liberty, rights, and autonomy.” A citizen can 
adhere to both sets of values at the same time. Although the two sets of values are negatively 
correlated, they refer to different spheres of life. Moreover, as shown below, traditional social 
values can buttress support for a democratic regime if the citizen is living under that kind of 
regime. Chen, “Conflict and constellation,” p. 100.  
FROM THE CLASSICS TO TODAY  29 
 
Journal of East-West Thought 
 
authoritarian states, the government does not try to instill liberal democratic political 
values in people, and the traditional social values serve as a barrier to people’s 
developing such values on their own.  
 
Table 7. Correlates of LDV in China 
male 0.036** 
age -0.289*** 
urban 0.197*** 
edu_level 0.360*** 
SOC_CAPITAL 0.065*** 
SOCTRUST_GENERAL -0.034** 
MEDIATRUST2 -0.155*** 
ECONPERF_FAM -0.050*** 
GOVERNANCE EFFECTIVENESS -0.217*** 
GOVERNANCE FAIRNESS -0.376*** 
NATIONAL PRIDE -0.212*** 
 
Table 7 looks at the people in China who are more favorable to liberal democratic 
values. They are the reverse of those who have stronger TSV, as we saw in Table 2. 
They are younger, more urban, and more educated. They have less social trust, less 
trust in media, and less favorable attitudes toward the government than respondents 
who reject liberal democratic values. In general, they are skeptical or critical. Looking 
at the same table for other countries (not shown here), we find that it is not only in 
authoritarian systems, but also in democratic systems like Japan, that people who 
adhere to LDV are more critical of government. Put another way, LDV values make 
citizens critical of government no matter whether they live under an authoritarian or a 
democratic regime. 
One of the reasons we are interested in political culture is that we would like to 
know how political culture contributes to popular support for regimes. For this 
purpose, the ABS team created a measure of “diffuse regime support” (DRS), which 
is a concept similar to that of regime legitimacy.19 The DRS battery tries to set aside 
people’s attitudes toward government incumbents, toward government policies, and 
toward the nation, and separate out their support for the type of political system – in 
effect, the country’s written or unwritten constitution. It asks respondents whether 
they think the government is capable of solving the problems that face the country; 
whether the respondent is “proud of our system of government,” whether the 
respondent believes that the “political system deserves people’s support,” and 
whether the respondent would “rather live under our system of government” than any 
other; the DRS score is a factor scale of the responses to these four questions.  
                                                             
19 David Easton, “A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support,” British Journal of 
Political Science 5:4 (October 1975), p. 444. 
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Table 8. Regression Coefficients for Diffuse Regime Support 
 
China Japan  Taiwan Hong Kong Singapore Vietnam 
TSV 0.342*** 0.308*** 0.101* 0.248** 0.109** 0.445*** 
LDV -0.247*** -0.133*** -0.170*** -0.321*** -0.233*** -0.190*** 
MEDIATRUST2 0.058*** 0.041* 0.048** 0.071** 0.062*** 0.078*** 
GOVERNANCE 
EFFECTIVENESS 
0.267*** 0.570*** 0.585*** 0.372*** 0.339*** 0.554*** 
GOVERNANCE FAIRNESS 0.176*** 0.318*** 0.291*** 0.469*** 0.122** 0.136*** 
NATIONAL_PRIDE 0.158*** 0.096** 0.200*** 0.099** 0.253*** 0.169*** 
Adjusted R squared .313 .330 .319 .294 .278 .318 
N 5677 2762 2950 1936 1603 1662 
Out of 7541 2961 3249 2424 2039 2391 
Missing % 24.72% 6.72% 9.20% 20.13% 21.38% 30.49% 
NOTES: Data are weighted. *p=.05, **p=.01, ***p=.001. 
Other variables included in the regression: male, age, urban, edu_level, religiosity2, POL_EFFICACY, 
SOC_CAPITAL, SOCTRUST_GENERAL, ECONPERF_FAM 
 
Table 8 shows that cultural values have a lot to do with this pattern. The table 
displays the regression coefficients for selected variables in selected countries, to 
illustrate the point.20 The adjusted r-squared shows that the overall regression model 
explains a considerable amount of the variation in diffuse regime support.21 It shows 
that media trust, perceived government performance, and national pride have a strong 
effect on DRS. But of most interest to us, the two cultural syndromes both have 
strong impacts, but their effects are opposite to one another. Everywhere, regardless 
of regime type, persons holding the traditional social values of conflict avoidance, 
                                                             
20 There are a large number of missing cases in some countries. This is probably partly because 
some of the questions built into this regression model are abstract and hard to answer, and 
perhaps partly because respondents in some countries view the questions as controversial. 
Persons holding traditional values may be especially reluctant to answer them. The high 
number of missing cases means that our confidence in the precision of the findings is not as 
high as it would be with fewer missing cases.  
21 The adjusted r-squared shows what percentage of variance in the dependent variable is 
explained by the model.  
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groupism, and deference to authority accord greater legitimacy to their regime. 
Everywhere, regardless of regime type, persons holding liberal democratic values are 
more critical of their country’s regime has. (Other variables in the model do not 
consistently have an effect across all countries.)  
 
 
 
Figure 3 reveals a seemingly paradoxical pattern. The more democratic the regime, 
the weaker is diffuse regime support. Koreans appear to be especially dissatisfied 
with their country’s political system, and Vietnamese especially satisfied. Chinese 
people are more satisfied than not, but in comparative perspective not especially 
supportive. 
This finding suggests that the persistence of traditional attitudes may be one of 
the secrets to why the Chinese regime still enjoys wide support across the population 
even in the midst of rapid, disorienting social change, which might otherwise 
destabilize the regime. On the other hand, if it is true that modernization is having its 
predicted effect on values, then it must be the case that the Chinese government is 
gradually cutting into the cultural basis of its political support as it pushes forward 
with its modernizing project of making China a “moderately well-off society” by 
2021, the hundredth anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party, 
and making it a “modern socialist country” by 2049, the hundredth anniversary of the 
establishment of the People’s Republic of China.  
As China modernizes, we can expect to see not only reduced deference to 
authority, but more dissatisfaction with the government and more bottom-up demand 
for liberalization. Such value change, however, does not mean that the Chinese 
regime will necessarily change on the same timeline as values change. Many other 
factors besides culture will influence political developments in China, including how 
fast the growth of the economy slows, whether the political leadership remains united 
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or undergoes a split, and contingent factors such as natural or health disasters or 
international conflicts. 
Tradition in China remains strong; the cultural values that are most prevalent in 
the highly modernized society of the 21st century are recognizably similar to those 
portrayed in the classic Chinese novels. The novels give us a richer sense of what 
those values meant and why they were so widely respected. Survey research gives us 
a richer sense of who holds the values and how they change over time. The qualitative 
and quantitative approaches to understand culture each offer something to enrich our 
understanding.  
